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Abstract 
International Relations (IR) has an ‘orthodox set’ of benchmark dates by which 
much of its research and teaching is organized: 1500, 1648, 1919, 1945 and 
1989. This article argues that IR scholars need to question the ways in which 
these orthodox dates serve as internal and external points of reference, think 
more critically about how benchmark dates are established, and generate a 
revised set of benchmark dates that better reflects macro-historical 
international dynamics. The first part of the article questions the 
appropriateness of the orthodox set of benchmark dates as ways of framing the 
discipline’s self-understanding. Sections two and three look at what counts as a 
benchmark date, and why. We systematise benchmark dates drawn from 
mainstream IR theories (realism, liberalism, constructivism/English School and 
sociological approaches) and then aggregate their criteria. Part four of the 
article uses this exercise to construct a revised set of benchmark dates which 
can widen the discipline’s theoretical and historical scope. We outline a way of 
ranking benchmark dates and suggest a means of assessing recent candidates 
for benchmark status. Overall, the article delivers two main benefits: first, an 
improved heuristic by which to think critically about foundational dates in the 
discipline; second, a revised set of benchmark dates which can help shift IR’s 
centre of gravity away from dynamics of war and peace, and towards a broader 





 Most research and teaching in International Relations (IR) is implicitly or 
explicitly organized around five major benchmark dates: 
 
 1500 – the opening of the sea lanes from Europe to the Americas and the 
Indian Ocean which created a global scale international system for the first 
time (e.g. Buzan and Little, 2000: 401-2);  
 1648 – the emergence of modern notions of sovereignty codified in the 
Treaty of Augsburg and, arguably, institutionalized in the Treaty of 
Westphalia (e.g. Philpott, 2001: 30, 77; Baylis and Smith, 2001: 54);  
 1919 – the end of World War One as establishing both the main subject 
matter of IR (dynamics of war and peace; great power relations) and IR as a 
formal discipline (e.g. Brown and Ainley, 2009: 18-23);  
 1945 – World War Two as marking the shift from a multipolar to bipolar 
system, establishing a new contest for world power (e.g. Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 2001; Lundestad, 2005: 1; Oatley, 2007: 27);  
 1989 – the shake-up to notions of sovereignty (by globalization) and polarity 
(by unipolarity) initiated by the end of the Cold War (e.g. Doyle and 
Ikenberry, 1997: 1-19; Gilpin, 1987: 3; Russett and Starr, 2004: 5-10).  
 
For the more historically minded (e.g. Reus-Smit, 1999), 1815 also registers, 
but not on the scale of the ‘big five’ benchmark dates. In the sub-field of 
Security Studies, 9/11 now serves as an important benchmark date (Buzan and 
Hansen, 2009: 226-55).2  
 The function of benchmark dates is to mark important turning points in 
the character and/or structure of international relations. They are a tool through 
which history is ordered into distinct, manageable parts. In principle there is 
nothing wrong with the use of benchmark dates – they are a standard way of 
simplifying history and fixing attention on particular issue-areas (May, 1975; 
Green, 1992; Buzan and Little, 2000: 386-406). In practice, however, IR 
scholars have given little systematic thought to the process by which they 
choose and institutionalise such foundational dates. They have propagated an 
‘orthodox set’ of benchmark dates without appearing to reflect much on the 
consequences either of privileging some dates over others, or of leaving 
important historical dynamics out altogether. For example, it is notable that 
none of IR’s current benchmark dates are located in the ‘long 19th century’, a 
period that witnessed the emergence and institutionalization of modern 
international order (Polanyi, 1957; Buzan and Lawson, 2013). More generally, 
the orthodox set of benchmark dates are serially reproduced in IR research and 




 Benchmark dates are important for three main reasons: first, because 
they stand as points of reference for the discipline’s self-understanding; 
second, because they operate as markers for how IR is viewed by other 
disciplines; and third, because they fix attention on specific events which, in 
turn, privilege some drivers of change over others. By what they highlight and 
what they silence, benchmarks dates shape how history is understood, 
funnelling attention towards particular events and processes, while 
downplaying others (May, 1975). Because history is a contested field of enquiry 
in which the importance of events and processes is regularly reassessed, 
choices about benchmarks dates will always be subject to critical re-evaluation. 
However, the choice is less whether or not to use benchmark dates, but 
whether particular dates are helpful or unhelpful. Benchmark dates are used in 
every discipline that engages with history as a means of placing boundaries 
around research and teaching, identifying turning points, and simplifying 
analysis. In short: benchmark dates are as important as theories – both serve 
as lenses which foreground some things, while marginalizing others.  
Our argument is that the current set of benchmark dates in IR is 
unhelpful, over-privileging the experience of modern Europe, and focusing the 
discipline too tightly around wars and their settlements. Our aim is to disrupt 
current understandings of IR’s foundational dates by building on scholarship 
which shifts IR away from a provincial interest in the history of the modern 
West (e.g. Tickner and Blaney, 2011). Failing to think sufficiently about either 
what benchmark dates represent, or how they function in the discipline, 
reinforces a narrow disciplinary imagination which means that IR is often 
looking in the wrong places at the wrong things, and missing or marginalising 
many of the fundamental events that have shaped modern international order. 
It is worth looking more carefully at how benchmark dates are constructed in IR 
and how its orthodox set might be improved. 
The argument proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, we examine 
the ‘orthodox set’ of benchmark dates in IR, questioning how appropriate they 
are as framing points for the discipline’s self-understanding. The second stage 
takes the form of a two part heuristic exercise which first, identifies criteria for 
benchmark dates from within the main strands of IR theory; and second, 
aggregates these criteria into nine tools used by the discipline to orient its 
research and teaching. This leads onto the third, final, stage of the argument in 
which we rank benchmark dates according to their global reach and long-term 
effects, making clear that such a ranking is fluid and subject to on-going 
reassessment. This stage of the argument includes the addition of new 
benchmark dates drawn from the ‘long 19th century’ which can turn IR away 
from its fixation with war and peace, and towards a range of macro-historical 
dynamics that better define its core agenda. This section also addresses the 
issue of how to assess recent events where the depth and breadth of changes 




The ‘Orthodox Set’ 
 
One is immediately struck by both the presentism and the West-centrism 
of the ‘big five’ benchmark dates. Three of IR’s primary benchmark dates are 
clustered in the 20th century (1919, 1945, 1989) and are separated by relatively 
short intervals. The two older dates (1500, 1648) are separated by longer 
intervals and do not suggest any sustained engagement with world history. It 
could be that history has accelerated, making big turning points more frequent, 
so that this compression into the recent past is justified. But IR is notoriously 
presentist and the list is suspiciously weighted towards both the view that 
Western history is world history, and to the rise of IR as a self-conscious 
discipline after World War One. While 1500 is clearly a world historical event, 
1648 might better be seen as a local European development. Why are major 
wars so prominent, and why are some wars favoured over others? Why do the 
fall of India to Britain in the late 18th century and the unification of China into a 
durable empire in 221 BC not register? And why is there no attention to the 19th 
century ‘global transformation’ during which many of the most important 
dynamics in contemporary international relations emerged?  
There is some discussion of benchmark dates in the discipline, but this is 
mainly around 1648, and tends to concentrate on the appropriateness (or not) 
of that date in representing the transition from medieval to modern. As is by 
now well rehearsed, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is usually considered to be 
the intellectual basis for the discipline, establishing a ‘revolution in sovereignty’ 
through the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, which is taken to be a 
‘historical faultline’ in the formation of modern international order (Philpott, 
2001: 30, 77). Some constructivists see Westphalia as marking a fundamental 
shift from feudal heteronomy to modern sovereign rule through the emergence 
of principles of exclusive territoriality, non-intervention and legal equality 
(Ruggie, 1983: 271-9). Westphalia is also given prominence by realists (e.g. 
Morgenthau, 1978), English School theorists (e.g. Watson, 1992) and liberal 
cosmopolitans (e.g. Held et al., 1995). Since the next orthodox benchmark is 
1919, 1648 in IR (and only in IR!) stands for the onset of modernity in the form 
of a system of sovereign territorial states. 
Regardless of the cross-paradigmatic hold of Westphalia in the discipline, 
its centrality to the formation of modern international order is questionable. 
Most obviously, Westphalia did not fundamentally alter the ground-rules of 
European international order. Neither sovereignty, non-intervention nor the 
principle of cuius regio, eius religio were mentioned in the Treaty (Osiander, 
2001: 266; Carvalho et al., 2011: 740). Rather, Westphalia was part of a long-
running contest for the leadership of dynastic European Christianity – its main 
concerns were to safeguard the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire and 
to reward the victors of the Wars of Religion (France and Sweden) (Osiander, 
2001: 266). Westphalia set limits to the idea of sovereignty established at the 
1555 Peace of Augsburg, for example by retracting the rights of polities to 
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choose their own confession. Instead, Westphalia decreed that each territory 
would retain the religion it held on 1st January 1624 (Teschke, 2003: 241; 
Carvalho et al., 2011: 740). More generally, Westphalia did not lead to the 
development of sovereignty in a modern sense – European order after 1648 
remained a patchwork of marriage, inheritance and hereditary claims rather 
than constituting a formal states system (Osiander, 2001: 278; Teschke, 2003: 
217; Nexon, 2009: 265). As Reus-Smit (1999: 87-154) argues, 1648 was about 
the transition from a medieval to an absolutist order in Europe, not a modern 
one. Overall, Westphalia was less a watershed than an affirmation of existing 
practices, including the centrality of imperial confederation, dynastic order and 
patrimonial rule (Nexon, 2009: 278-80).  
Despite this extensive challenge to the significance of Westphalia as a 
watershed date, the place of 1648 in the discipline’s self-understanding 
remains strong. This matters not just because it is suspect intellectually, but 
also because it means that much of IR’s research and teaching is fixed around 
narrow debates (such as sovereignty) and particular regions (such as modern 
Europe). It saddles IR with an understanding of modernity not shared by other 
disciplines and leads it to marginalize the later development of the modern 
nation state that had such a major impact on international relations during the 
19th century. Indeed, as the discussion around 1648 demonstrates, when a 
benchmark date represents a specific point-in-time event, there is a tendency 
for debate to becoming inward-looking (centring on the precise content of the 
event which marks that date) rather than outward-looking (using dates as a 
means to open-up enquiry into macro-historical dynamics). 
This blinkered focus is reinforced by other orthodox benchmark dates, 
particularly 1919, which gravely misrepresents the founding story of IR’s 
establishment as a discipline. 1919 occludes the fact that international thought 
became increasingly systematized during the last part of the 19th century, being 
taught in some US Political Science departments (such as Columbia) and 
fuelling major debates in both Europe and the United States (Knutsen, 1997; 
Schmidt, 1998; Carvalho et al, 2011: 749). Hobson, Angell, Laski, Zimmern, 
Lenin, Woodrow Wilson et al., were part of a burgeoning discourse which 
engaged in 19th century IR concerns: the rights and wrongs of imperialism, the 
increasing hold of notions of popular sovereignty and self-determination, the 
relationship of free trade and protectionism to international conflict, and the 
capacity of war to be mitigated by international law and intergovernmental 
institutions (Grant et al., 1916; Hobson, 2012). Standard accounts also tend to 
omit the closeness of the links between IR, colonial administration and racism 
(Bell, 2007; Vucetic, 2010; Hobson, 2012), not to mention geopolitics. Indeed, a 
great deal of IR’s intellectual history, and the historical developments that 
define many of its current concerns, are rooted in 19th century preoccupations 
with the superiority – or otherwise – of white races and Western civilization. IR, 
therefore, did not spring de novo in 1919, but has a longer genealogy formed in 
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the unprecedented environment of global modernity during the late 19th 
century.  
Other orthodox dates are equally suspect. For example, although ‘both 
academics and policy-makers tend to use 1989 and its surrogate frames (such 
as Cold War/post-Cold War) as the principal normative, analytical and empirical 
shorthand for delineating past and present’, there are many parts of the world 
for which 1989 has little, or uncertain, importance (Lawson, 2010: 1). This 
benchmark date relates to a series of changes that looked big at the time, but 
appear less so the further away they get. As we discuss below, 1989 has not 
passed any test more stringent than the end of bipolarity and it is questionable 
how significant that shift is in a longer perspective.  
 Despite their sometimes tenuous historical importance, the orthodox set 
of benchmark dates have important consequences not just for how IR 
understands and reproduces itself, but also for how it interacts with and helps 
to constitute the ‘real world’ that it observes. ‘The myths [of 1648 and 1919] 
have had a tremendous function in disciplining our thinking about fundamental 
issues in international politics, “normalising” it as common sense and providing 
the parameters or outer boundaries within which the disciplinary field is 
contained’ (Carvalho et al., 2011: 756). This complaint resonates with those 
who critique much existing IR literature for its weak appreciation of dynamics of 
imperialism, colonialism, dispossession and expropriation in the formation of 
modern international order (e.g. Keene, 2002; Suzuki, 2009; Shilliam, 2011). 
Like the ways in which 1919 delinks IR from its origins in imperialism, racism 
and geopolitics, other benchmark dates omit the inter-societal configurations 
which shape macro-historical shifts. Perhaps most notably, the jump from 1648 
to 1919 leaves out the inter-societal reconfiguration which, during the ‘long 19th 
century’, both marked the transformation to global modernity and enabled the 
West to build a hierarchical international order. This period is the central 
concern for sociology, historical sociology, economic history, world history and 
law. Its absence from IR’s orthodox set of benchmark dates is both surprising 
and problematic.  
 In summary, the ‘big five’ benchmark dates provide few insights into key 
issue-areas within the discipline. One way of responding to this weakness 
would be to do without benchmark dates at all. However, as noted above, 
benchmark dates are indispensible. They play a central role in IR’s self-
understanding, operate as signalling devices to other disciplines, and sustain a 
historical narrative which undergirds how the discipline conducts much of its 
research and teaching. Another response would be to use the poverty of 
existing benchmark dates in order to explore issues of temporal heterogeneity 
within world politics (e.g. Hutchings, 2008). In part, we agree. However, the 
current use of benchmark dates in IR funnels attention towards a narrowly 
defined set of issue-areas. If this orthodox set is flawed, it is necessary to find 




What is a Benchmark Date? 
 
 The big five benchmark dates are embedded (often unreflectively) within 
existing theoretical approaches in IR. But what exactly are the criteria that 
underpin them? For 1500, the key point is the expansion in the scale of the 
international system. Within a few years of this date, European navigators 
crossed the Atlantic and sailed around Africa in ways that could be replicated. 
In doing so, they opened the way for a global scale international system. The 
other four dates are defined by the ending of major wars and their settlements: 
the Thirty Years War and Westphalia, the First World War and Versailles, 
World War Two and San Francisco, the Cold War and the end of bipolarity. 
Looking at major wars and their settlements is a common mode of analysis for 
thinking about periodization across several schools of IR theory (e.g. Gilpin, 
1981; Holsti, 1991; Reus-Smit, 1999; Ikenberry, 2001; Clark, 2005, 2007). But 
if the ending of major wars is such a major part of how benchmark dates are 
constructed in IR, why does the discipline give relatively slight attention to 
Utrecht, 1713, which ended the wars of Louis XIV, and only a little more to 
1815 and the end of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars? If the 
answer is that IR does not look beyond its founding as a self-conscious field of 
study, then Westphalia should not be there either. The fact that IR’s benchmark 
dates are not just about major wars suggests that more than one type of criteria 
for benchmarking is in play. It also underlines the ad hoc quality of the orthodox 
set.  
 So what kinds of events and processes should count as benchmark 
dates? The orthodox set features changes in the scale of the system (1500), 
changes in the nature of the dominant unit (1648), and changes in the 
management and/or polarity of international order (1919, 1945, 1989). Since 
the act of establishing benchmark dates is about declaring some events to be 
more important than others because they are era-defining, the process of 
establishing benchmark dates rests on propositions about what constitutes 
moments of historical change that are particularly significant for IR. The best 
way to ascertain what should count as a benchmark date in IR is to examine 
what mainstream theories – realism, liberalism, constructivism, the English 
School, and sociological approaches – suggest as criteria for identifying 
significant change in the international system.3 
 Realism presents four ways of thinking about benchmark dates, 
sometimes explicitly, at other times implicitly. First is a change in the organizing 
principle of the international system. For neorealists, the only alternative to 
anarchy is hierarchy, but there is room for debate about way stations between 
these poles, including hegemony, suzerainty, dominion and empire (Watson, 
1992). Second is a change in the status of war from being possible and 
expected, to being unlikely and unexpected. This change might also include 
shifts in which war and the balance of power are no longer the defining 
dynamics of the international system, and/or in which a change in the nature of 
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military power brings into question the viability of the state, the utility of war and 
balancing dynamics. The emergence of nuclear weapons is the obvious 
example of this latter type (e.g. Deudney, 2007). Third is a change in the 
distribution of power amongst the great powers. This is the central element in 
neorealist polarity theory; the proposition is that changes matter more as 
numbers get lower. Fourth is a change in the nature of the dominant unit away 
from the sovereign territorial state. Realists do not dwell on this possibility 
because they think it is unlikely. But it is, at least, an implicitly held assumption 
within the theory. This final issue underpins the importance of 1648 because 
Westphalia is seen as establishing the principle of sovereignty which underpins 
the modern international system.  
 These four candidates fit well with orthodox IR benchmark dates. Realists 
emphasise continuity in international relations (excepting the distribution of 
power) and do not expect there to be changes in the system structure, the 
dominant unit of the system, the salience of the balance of power or the 
centrality of conflict. The 1648 benchmark date serves realism by emphasising 
the durability of the sovereign state and anarchy as framing devices. Major 
wars and their settlements are seen as vehicles through which great powers 
project their preferred rules and practices onto the international system. Such 
wars may reflect polarity changes, but unless these are at the small number 
end, they are not considered to be structural changes. Research on balancing 
is supported by benchmark dates such as 1945 and 1989, with the system 
undergoing a shift from multipolarity to bipolarity after 1945, and from bipolarity 
to unipolarity after 1989.  
 Liberals, and more broadly those interested in international political 
economy (IPE), are also interested in changes in the organizing principle of the 
international system, and many of them have long thought that such changes 
are underway (e.g. Keohane and Nye, 1977). For liberals, the strict separation 
between anarchy and hierarchy (or international and domestic) is reduced by 
heightened levels of interdependence, deeper trade regimes, increasingly 
powerful mechanisms of global governance, and the durability of security 
communities. Liberals emphasize shifts in governance through the emergence 
and spread of international organizations, so developments such as the 
founding of the League of Nations (1919) and the United Nations (1945) 
register strongly. Liberals also emphasize major changes in the rules, norms 
and practices that govern the global political economy. In 1862, for example, 
the British Companies Act marked a shift to limited liability firms and opened 
the way to the formation of transnational corporations as a significant new actor 
in international relations. Along these lines one could also think about 1600 as 
a symbolic date for the founding of chartered companies by European imperial 
powers between 1553 and 1670 (Buzan and Little, 2000: 267-8). The great 
depression which began in 1929 is another possible benchmark date, likewise 
the major change of rules put in place by Bretton Woods in 1944, the US 
termination of dollar convertibility in 1971 and the 2008 financial crash.4 
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Looking back further, the repeal of the British Corn Laws in 1846, which 
opened the way to free trade, could be a benchmark date as could be the first 
industrial-era depression starting in 1873. The opening up of ocean routes 
around 1500 is an important IPE benchmark date, transforming the capacity to 
move people, goods, money and ideas around the world. So too is the period 
between 1840 and 1870, when the planet was wired for more or less 
instantaneous communication by telegraph, and huge increases in speed and 
carrying capacity were instigated by the spread of steamships and railways.  
 Looking at such a list, it is apparent that there is a less straightforward 
relationship between liberal/IPE benchmark dates and the ‘big five’ than there 
is with realism. The reason for this is obvious – IR’s orthodox set of benchmark 
dates is mainly oriented around political-military events rather than dynamics of 
interdependence, trade or global governance. Only where there is overlap 
between these processes and wars (e.g. 1919 and 1945) do liberal/IPE 
concerns register. The 1500 benchmark date opens up the possibility of other 
benchmarks defined by predominantly liberal themes, but so far this remains 
an outlier within the orthodox set. 
 Constructivists and English School theorists have a number of ways of 
identifying IR benchmarks. Wendt (1999: 314), for example, posits three 
cultures of international anarchy – Kantian (friendship), Lockean (rivalry) and 
Hobbesian (enmity) – and suggests two historical transformations between 
them: the first from Hobbesian to Lockean in 17th century Europe (roughly 
analogous to 1648); the second from Lockean to Kantian in the decades 
following 1945, which Wendt locates primarily within the West. Both of these 
transformations point to regional rather than global benchmark dates. 
Reus-Smit (1999), operating within both the English School and 
constructivism, offers a somewhat different schema, building on Ruggie’s 
(1983) critique of Waltz in order to identify a shift from medieval to modern as a 
transformation of both ordering principle and dominant unit. Reus-Smit labels 
this process: ‘configurative change’. To this process he adds ‘purposive 
change’, defined as change in the ‘moral purpose of the state’ and consequent 
shifts in the meaning of sovereignty (as captured by the transformation to 
modernity). Reus-Smit’s scheme generates two candidates for benchmark 
dates, a configurative change from medieval to absolutism, for which he uses 
the symbolic date 1648, and a purposive change from absolutism to modernity, 
to which he does not give a date, but sees as beginning in the late 18th century 
and becoming dominant by the mid-to-late 19th century, roughly 1776-1870. 
The English School’s scheme of ‘primary institutions’ offers more 
precision in terms of tracking changes in ideas and their associated practices, 
norms and rules. Primary institutions are evolved rather than designed, and 
they are constitutive of both states and international society in that they define 
the basic character and purpose of any such society. The classical English 
School focused on five primary institutions – war, international law, the balance 
of power, great power management and diplomacy (Bull, 1977) – with 
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sovereignty and territoriality more implicitly also in play, and colonialism in play 
but not discussed. To this set have been added, inter alia, nationalism, human 
rights, the market and, most recently, environmental stewardship (Buzan, 2004: 
240-49). Primary institutions are durable but not fixed, and their rise, evolution 
and decline can be traced (Holsti, 2004; Buzan, 2004). Nationalism, for 
example, evolved into a primary institution of international society from the late 
18th century onwards (Mayall, 1990), while slavery (during the 19th century) and 
colonialism (after World War Two) have declined as primary institutions. It is 
not always easy to allocate dates to these extended processes of change, but 
1870 might stand for the rise of nationalism, 1833 for the demise of slavery and 
1945 for the obsolescence of colonialism. Clark (2005, 2007, 2011), also 
working within the English School, offers the concepts of legitimacy and 
hegemony as an alternative to primary institutions. Legitimacy, for example, is 
defined in terms of rightful membership and rightful conduct (Clark, 2005: 2, 9), 
and Clark (2005: 7, 19-25) sees this as a clearer way than primary institutions 
to identify significant change in international society. His scheme is hinged to 
major wars and their settlements – Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Versailles, 
San Francisco and the ending of the Cold War – and so provides a better fit 
with the orthodox set of benchmark dates.  
Also available within the English School as a candidate for benchmark 
dates are changes in the membership of international society. The English 
School’s ‘expansion’ story (Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992; Buzan and 
Little, 2010; Reus-Smit, 2011) suggests several possible benchmark dates: the 
widening of international society from European to Western (with the 
incorporation of the Americas during the late 18th and early 19th centuries); the 
inclusion of non-Western states such as Japan during the late 19th century; the 
breakup of some continental empires after World War One; the universalization 
of formal membership through anti-imperial struggle and colonial retreat after 
1945; and the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
Finally, there are several sociological approaches within IR, including 
Marxism, historical sociology and differentiation theory, which also identify 
candidates for IR benchmark dates.5 Many Marxists focus on the 19th century 
as containing the principal shift to modern international relations (e.g. 
Hobsbawm, 1962; Rosenberg, 1994). This focus on the industrial revolution, 
and the 19th century economic, political and social transformations associated 
with it, can also be found in other literatures, particularly world history (e.g. 
Bayly, 2004). Other Marxists, such as Teschke (2003), emphasize earlier 
dates, placing emphasis on the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England which, it 
is argued, ushered in a new mode of property relations which worked to 
unravel absolutist rule and, in turn, enabled the modern international system to 
emerge. Immanuel Wallerstein goes back still further, seeing 1500 as the 
transformational point between world empires and world capitalism. 
A number of historical sociologists in IR focus on the constitutive role 
played by revolutions in the making of modern international order, seeing these 
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as important benchmark dates. Fred Halliday (1999), for example, used 
revolutions to construct an alternative periodization of modern international 
order, recalibrating the 16th century as a time of political and ideological 
struggle unleashed by the European Reformations, re-establishing the central 
optic of the 17th century around the upheavals which followed the Dutch Revolt 
and the English Revolution, re-centring the 18th and 19th centuries around the 
Atlantic Revolutions of France, America and Haiti, and understanding the ‘short 
20th century’ as one in which the primary logic was the challenge – and 
collapse – of the Bolshevik Revolution and its Third World inheritors. As 
Halliday and others (e.g. Walt, 1997; Armstrong, 1993; Lawson 2005) show, 
there is a close relationship between revolutions and international order. Even 
if the attempts by revolutionary states to overturn existing trade, security and 
alliance regimes do not fully succeed, there are still a number of instances of 
revolution (such as Haiti, France, Russia, China, Cuba, Iran and the series of 
transformations associated with the end of the Cold War) which have had a 
major impact on international order and which, therefore, stand as candidates 
for benchmark dates.  
Finally, there is differentiation theory (Buzan and Albert, 2010). 
Differentiation theory sees social structure as distinguished by dominant modes 
of differentiation: segmentary (like units), stratificatory (units differentiated by 
rank or status) and functional (differentiation by type of activity). This schema 
provides a powerful means of surveying macro-historical transformations. For 
example, it sees the shift from hunter-gatherer to agricultural production as one 
from segmentary to stratificatory differentiation and the shift from absolutism to 
modernity as from stratificatory to either functional differentiation (because 
politics, economy and society are separated into distinct activities) or 
segmentary differentiation (because within the political sphere, modern states 
become like units on the basis of sovereign equality). 
Where does this survey of possible benchmark dates within IR leave us? 
The first and most obvious conclusion is that IR theory generates a cornucopia 
of criteria for benchmark dates, many of which go well beyond the orthodox set. 
The second conclusion is that, despite their different starting points, there is a 
substantial degree of overlap among the various approaches in terms of the 
location of dates deemed to be significant. Looking at the columns in Table 1 
suggests a certain amount of coherence in benchmark dates across these 
strands of theory. The third conclusion is that benchmark dates are necessary 
to theory building. IR theories mostly centre on differentiating continuity from 
change. Although they differ in the criteria by which they do this, the process of 
making such a differentiation rests of the significance of transformation points 
(i.e. benchmark dates) by necessity. 
 




The fourth conclusion is that there are three types of benchmark date 
operating within IR: 
 
1. Point-in-time events seen as turning points (e.g. 1929, 1989, 2008). 
2. Relatively short, sharp, transition periods, often featuring major wars and 
symbolized by the dates of the treaties that settle them (e.g. 1713, 1815, 
1919, 1945). 
3. Tipping points for transformative processes that are decades, possibly 
centuries, in duration (e.g. 1500, 1600, 1648, and the various attempts to 
capture the 19th century global transformation). In this understanding, 
benchmark dates represent clusters of events which open up enquiry into 
a range of nested dynamics. 
 
This basic difference in terms of how IR theories approach benchmark 
dates matters considerably when we come to assess their impact and, in turn, 
think about how to rank them. 
 
Aggregating the Criteria for Benchmark Dates  
 
At this point we come to a major fork in the analytical road. Since we 
have argued that the process of establishing benchmark dates is necessary to 
theory building, it would be possible to form distinct benchmark date schemes 
for each major strand of IR theory. Doing that, however, can only produce 
partial, parallel sets of benchmarks, abandoning the attempt to treat IR (or at 
least mainstream IR) as a whole. We leave that task to others. Instead, we take 
the second fork: aggregating insights across the range of theories surveyed 
above. Our method here is to distil the basic principles underlying the dates in 
Table 1. This is mainly a pragmatic move aimed at generating a synoptic view 
of the logic underlying benchmark dates for mainstream IR as a whole. The 
nine criteria for benchmark dates set out below – organizing principle, social 
organizing principle, interaction capacity, system scale, societal scale, systemic 
crises, dominant unit, distribution of power, and mode of power – thus 
represent mainstream IR thinking as it currently stands. Aggregation has its 
own theoretical justification in that IR theories can best be understood as 
representing a set of partial truths about international relations. The 
consonance between the dates in Table 1’s columns is not so surprising given 
that IR theories are in some sense addressing the same ‘reality’, but looking at 
it, or constructing it, from different perspectives. Shared, and/or clustered dates 
across the theories are, therefore, themselves of theoretical interest.  
 One possible problem with aggregation is that IR theories are divided 
between those that emphasise material factors and talk in terms of international 
systems, and those that emphasise social factors and talk in terms of 
international societies. But there are so many points of contact and overlap 
between these two traditions that it is difficult to separate them. Even Waltz 
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talks about ‘socialization’, while many constructivists and English School 
theorists acknowledge a ‘rump materialism’. With this in mind, our aggregated 




 Waltz (1979) opened up deep structural change as a possible system 
benchmark, but then closed it by arguing that anarchy is, and has been, a 
universal condition of the international system. Ruggie (1983) challenged the 
centrality of anarchy to neorealism by opening up the medieval-to-modern 
transformation as a shift from an organizing principle of heteronomy to one of 
anarchy. This medieval-to-modern story is somewhat Eurocentric, 
marginalizing the many classical instances in the non-European world of 
international systems taking on hierarchic forms (Buzan and Little, 2000). 
Nevertheless, systems logic clearly allows for deep structural changes. Such 
changes are likely to be infrequent and, for some neorealists, virtually 
inconceivable. But when they do occur, they will be extremely significant.  
 
Social organizing principles 
 
 All thinking about international society presupposes that an international 
system exists. For this reason, international society theorists operate with the 
same, or at least a similar set, of system structures – mainly variations on 
anarchy. They are also sensitive to the impact of changes in interaction 
capacity on normative structures. But international society theorists are not just 
interested in the principles that differentiate units. They are also interested in 
the normative structures that constitute units and shape their behaviour. As 
Onuf (2002: 228) astutely observes, for realists ‘sovereignty is the only rule that 
matters for the constitution of anarchy’. International society theorists see a 
much richer and more variable picture of social structure. Normative structures 
vary across space and time. A change in the organizing principle of the system 
and a change in the normative structure of international society are almost 
certainly mutually constitutive. But social structure can also change within a 
given system structure, as implied by Wendt’s (1992) dictum: ‘anarchy is what 
states make of it’ (see also Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 244). As noted in the 
above survey, there are many possibilities for how to conceptualise the 
normative structure of international society, including: Wendt’s typology of 
Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian societies; the English School’s primary 
institutions; Reus-Smit’s ‘constitutional structures’; Clark’s understanding of 
legitimacy in terms of the ‘standard of civilization’ that has to be met by those 
aspiring to membership; Marxist approaches that focus on the dominant mode 
of production; historical sociological approaches that focus on both macro-
historical transformations and the role of revolutions in challenging existing 
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patterns of international order; and sociological theories that focus on the 




 Interaction capacity is about the ability to move people, goods, 
information, money and military power around the system. A system dominated 
by agrarian technologies of horses and sailing ships has a much lower 
interaction capacity than one dominated by industrial technologies: railways, 
steamships, telecommunications and aircraft. Systems with low interaction 
capacity are likely to be sub-global. A thin global system was created by 
relatively advanced sailing ship technologies at the end of the 15th century. 
Since then, the impact of increasing interaction capacity has not primarily been 
in terms of a shift in the scale of the international system, but about a shift in 
terms of its density. Steamships, railways, canals and the telegraph massively 
increased interaction capacity during the 19th century, underpinning the 
creation of an interdependent world economy with a core-periphery structure. 
During the 20th century, radio, aircraft, satellites and the Internet have 
continued to shrink the planet and increase the density of interactions of all 
kinds, from politics to pollution, and from sport to finance. This raft of changes 
in interaction capacity is of high significance to the material and social 





 A consequence of rising or falling interaction capacity is increases or 
decreases in the scale of the international system. This is why 1500 figures in 
the orthodox set of benchmark dates – it represents the shift to a global scale 
international order. However, unless humankind begins to inhabit space 
beyond the planet, no further increases in physical scale are possible. This 





 The scale of international society does not necessarily correlate with the 
scale of the international system. A variant on this would be that international 
society can take different forms, or have different layers, within the international 
system, as during the 19th century when a Western international society 
coexisted alongside a colonial one (Keene, 2002). The result is a different set 
of benchmark dates for system and society in terms of scale. Whereas one 
might date the opening of a global international system to circa 1500, a global 
international society did not come into being until after 1945 with the major 
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round of decolonization. The English School’s narrative of the expansion of 
international society (Bull and Watson, 1984; Watson, 1992; Buzan, 2010; 
Buzan and Little, 2010; Reus-Smit, 2011) serves as a general guide to this 
difference in the scale of international society and international system, 




 We have already noted a tendency within IR, most notably amongst 
realists, to privilege major wars and their settlements as benchmark dates. 
Such wars are, of course, crises where the ordering principles of international 
society fail to contain conflict – or sometimes promote it. But wars are not the 
only kind of crisis in play. Economic breakdowns such as those of 1873, 1929 
and 2008 do not necessarily correlate with wars, but may have a similar scale 
of effects on norms and practices. Similarly, revolutions in major states are not 
always correlated with systemic wars, as in 1776 and 1949, although they can 
be, as in 1789 and 1917. Such revolutions challenge the social structure of 
international society by creating, as for much of the 20th century, configurations 





 Changes in dominant unit are tied to that of organizing principle. Most  
notably, any change in organizing principle will also embody a change in the 
dominant unit, as it does for the medieval-to-modern transformation (Ruggie, 
1983; Reus-Smit, 1999). That said, it is possible that the organizing principle of 
anarchy could manifest itself in different types of units. Waltz (1990, 37; see 
also 1979: 91) himself suggests this with his argument that the structure of 
anarchy will have the same effect ‘whether the system is composed of tribes, 
nations, oligopolistic firms or street gangs’. In Waltz’s scheme, a transformation 
of dominant unit would count as less significant than a change in organizing 
principle. 
 
Distribution of capabilities  
 
 This is neorealism’s most common, but least deep, type of structural 
change. Waltz concentrates on relative power in terms of the distribution of 
capabilities, thereby distinguishing great powers from other states. In this 
perspective, the nature of power does not matter, just its distribution. Changes 
in the number of great powers are structurally inconsequential above four, but 
increasingly consequential as the number of great powers shrinks towards two, 
or more problematically within the theory, one. There is also the hegemonic 
stability version of this story (e.g. Gilpin, 1981), in which one leading power 
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takes responsibility for stabilizing the capitalist world economy (Netherlands, 
Britain, the United States, etc.). 
 
Mode of power 
 
 Excluded from Waltz’s theory, yet conspicuous in both his work and that 
of other realists, particularly those who debate the impact of nuclear weapons 
on the functionality of the state and the utility of war (Waltz, 1981; Herz, 1957), 
is the dominant ‘mode of power’. The debate about the extent to which nuclear 
weapons have systemic effects opens the door to wider questions about 
transformations in the mode of power. Nuclear weapons represent a specific, 
point-in-time transformation. But underpinning them was the shift from agrarian 
to industrial military power that took place during the 19th century. That shift 
opened up a significant power gap between industrializing and non-
industrializing societies. It altered relations between Europe and Asia, changed 
the criteria for being considered a great power, reoriented the nature and 
conduct of war, and caused a shift in notions of military rivalry and balance 
(Buzan and Lawson, 2013). Neorealism assumes that the mode of power is 
more or less constant. However, at times, differences in power configurations 
such as those which manifested in the 19th century, and which were further 
realised by the advent of nuclear weapons, matter enormously. Indeed, 
because they change not just the leading players in a system, but also the 
ground-rules of the system itself, changes in the mode of power have more 
significance than changes in the distribution of power. 
 
 The explication of these criteria illustrate that most IR theories assume 
that some types of change are deeper and more significant than others. Most 
agree, for example, that a change in the organizing principle of the system, or a 
change in the mode of power, is weightier than a change in the distribution of 
power. There is also a basic sense that scale matters: some changes are 
mainly regional (1648), whereas others are global (1500, 1945). However, 
there is not much in the way of systematic thinking about how to assess issues 
of depth or breadth. Is a change in the mode of power weightier than a change 
in the social organizing principle? Might a major change in interaction capacity 
or scale outweigh a relatively small change in deeper organizing principles? 
There are no clear answers to these questions from within mainstream IR 
theories.  
 
Revising Benchmark Dates  
 
The final step in our argument is to build on the nine criteria identified in 
the previous section in order to find benchmark dates that: a) better represent 
what is important to IR as a whole rather than just specific theoretical traditions 
within it; and b) establish a more productive agenda for the discipline than that 
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envisaged by the orthodox set. We are conscious that even with the 
systematization and aggregation proposed above, there is still considerable 
leeway for argument about how to assess benchmark dates. We are also 
conscious that we are addressing IR as a whole, and that it is worth trying to 
identify clusters of significant dates across a range of theories. One constraint 
is that both clustering and significance are easier to see the further back they 
are in time. Understanding the significance of 1500 or 1648 is a lot easier than 
evaluating 1989, 2001 or 2008. We also take into account the extent to which 
events are global or regional in scale, and how major or minor their effects are. 
At the same time, we need to keep in mind both the three types of benchmark 
date (point in time events, short transition periods, long-term transformations) 
and the nine forms of change noted above. This allows us to organize 
benchmark dates into primary, secondary and tertiary categories.  
Primary benchmarks are clusters of events that signify major processes 
of macro-historical transformation. They: a) stand as demarcation points for 
examining a range of transformational processes; and b) act as markers for a 
concatenation of interlinked – or nested – events. Primary benchmark dates 
display a substantial cluster of significant changes of which either at least one 
must be deep, or else several must be of substantial weight. They must also 
carry global significance. Clusters of events will not, of course, all fall in the 
same year. As such, following the precedent set by 1648, we try to find a 
median, or tipping point, date that represents a useful segue into these 
dynamics. Where possible, and against existing practice, we favour neutral 
years in which no specific event of significance took place. This loses the 
drama of ‘big date’ events, but avoids the distraction of inward-looking, 
scholastic controversies about the significance or otherwise of particular 
events, such as those that have plagued discussions of 1648. It also reduces 
the association of benchmark dates with certain normative positions – for 
example, 1989 is celebrated in some countries (particularly those in Eastern 
and Central Europe), but has mostly negative connotations in others (as for 
some in Russia and China). Most importantly, such a strategy opens up IR to a 
range of macro-historical processes which are otherwise submerged or 
overlooked. For example, we make the case below for seeing 1860 as a 
primary benchmark because it serves as an illustrative date for a range of 
nested processes: state rationalization, industrialization, technological change, 
shifting modes of warfare, ideological transformation, and so on. A neutral date 
like that is far better than say, 1848 or 1870, each of which would privilege a 
particular view of a much wider transformation. Although major wars and their 
settlements remain important to some benchmark dates in IR, this new 
understanding sees primary benchmark dates as interlinked configurations of 
social processes. This way of thinking carries with it the promise of realigning 
research and teaching in IR around broader configurations of macro-historical 
change rather than the punctuation marks which often neglect, disguise or 
occlude these dynamics.  
  
18 
Secondary benchmark dates display a lesser cluster of significant 
changes without any being both deep and global. They might be more local in 
influence, or if global in consequence, less significant than primary 
benchmarks. Tertiary benchmark dates are mainly point-in-time events which 
are not significantly clustered with other dynamics or are local/regional rather 
than global. Introducing ranking in this way raises an ambiguity about whether 
primary, secondary and tertiary dates are distinct categories or somehow 
nested. All, or very nearly all, point in time dates are by themselves tertiary, 
and most of these will be scooped up into primary or secondary clusters. 
Primary and secondary benchmark dates are made up of different scales, 
intensities and depths of clustering. Secondary clusters might get incorporated 
into primary ones or might stand separately in their own right. This nesting 
quality differentiates benchmark dates from chronological attempts at 
periodization. Periodization is a linear form of benchmarking which assumes 
that history can be divided into a sequence of eras generally assumed to be of 
more or less equal significance. By ranking benchmark dates, we want to 
emphasise the potential for nesting and clustering, and thereby open up IR to a 
subtler way of thinking about eras. 
It is important to note that benchmark dates can move between these 
layers as their association with clusters of processes becomes either more or 
less pronounced. This is particularly likely when examining dates close to the 
present day. For example, events such as the 2008 financial crisis or 9/11, 
although appearing to be relatively confined to certain regions of the world, 
may in retrospect end up as part of a broader configuration which marks the 
diffusion and re-centring of global power. Equally, other possible benchmark 
dates, such as 1815, may decline in influence as their value as entry points into 
macro-historical dynamics is taken by alternative vantage points, such as 1860. 
In this way, benchmark dates should be seen as fluid rather than permanent, 
part of on-going discussions rather than performing any kind of fixed, 
disciplining function. Benchmark dates, like all historical analyses, are open to 
debate and reassessment in the light of how subsequent developments affect 
appreciation of their significance. 
 We confine this preliminary ordering of benchmark dates to modern 
history. If we were to extend the exercise further back, we would have to 
consider earlier expansions of international systems, the Axial age of world 
religions, the discovery of agriculture, the rise of cities and the more complex 
cultures that went with them, and so on. We would also run into the problem 
that there was no global international system before 1500, which would require 
dealing with several sub-global assessments in parallel. We think that 
benchmarking exercises could and should be done for pre-1500 international 
systems, and anticipate that their relevance will increase as a more globally 
based international order displaces the transitional period of Western 




Primary benchmark dates  
 
 There are three clusters of modern changes that meet the criteria for 
primary benchmark dates in IR, all of which are of global reach and have deep 
significance. The neutral years that stand as gateways into these broader 
configurations are: 1500, 1860 and 1942.  
 
1500 
 Here the main transformative event is the rapid opening up of the sea-
lanes from Europe to Southern Africa, the Indian Ocean, the Americas, and 
across the Pacific between 1487 and 1522. As just noted, this expansion of the 
international system to planetary scale changed the nature of IR. It precipitated 
the death of most of the native populations and civilizations of the Americas, 
inaugurated a great transfer of flora and fauna and diseases among Eurasia, 
Africa and the Americas, opened the Indian Ocean trading system to the 
dominance of European gunboats, and led to a thin but significant global 
economy in commodities ranging from silks and silver to spices and slaves. For 
some scholarship, this marks the beginning of world capitalism (e.g. 
Wallerstein, 1974). The impact of this cluster of macro-historical processes 
around 1500 was limited by the scope of agrarian technology, but it paved the 
way for the huge intensification of the global economy, and the mass human 
migrations that accompanied it, during later periods. This form of change is 
generally now occluded in IR theory because a change in the physical scale of 
the international system has no immediate contemporary relevance. The 
transformation to global scale was a one-off process, one which is clearly both 
deep and, by definition, of global significance. 
 
1860 
 1860 represents the biggest, deepest, widest cluster of transformative 
processes in the last 500 years. 1860 is nested within a configuration of 
changes that flowed throughout the 19th century, but accelerated and became 
dominant between 1840 and 1870. The deepest change was that from an 
agrarian, absolutist form of society to an industrial, mass society – in short, to 
modernity. A configuration of interlinked changes gave rise to a new mode of 
production, new class structures, new ideas, new modes of organization, and 
vastly increased interaction capacity. Taken together, these generated a new 
mode of power.  
In terms of ideas, by 1860, nationalism, socialism, liberalism and ideas of 
permanent human progress had profoundly changed the social organizing 
principles of international society. Darwinism (1859) had just hit. The nation 
state was in the midst of replacing absolutist composite states – the unification 
of Germany (1870) both displayed the triumph of the national principle and 
created a new industrial power that was to destabilize the balance of power for 
the next eight decades. By 1860, industrial capitalism was well advanced in 
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replacing agrarian forms of political economy and was in the midst of creating a 
more integrated, but sharply unequal, global economy. It was also beginning to 
push global CO2 emissions and population growth into the geometric curves 
familiar today. Industrialization further revolutionised transportation (railways, 
steamships, the Suez Canal) and communication (the telegraph), which, in 
turn, engendered major increases in both trade and migration. By 1860, 
industrialization was also beginning to change the face of arms racing (the 
French ironclad Gloire was launched in 1859) and war (as was made apparent 
during the US Civil War of the early 1860s). It had already introduced the huge 
inequality of military power between core and periphery demonstrated by 
Britain’s easy defeat of China in the 1840s. On the other side of this dynamic, 
the Indian Revolt of 1857 was the forerunner to later resistances to Western 
imperialism. 
 This period also marks the beginning and take-off of ‘liberal ascendency’ 
(Ikenberry, 2009). By 1860, economics was acquiring some autonomy from 
politics and the global market was beginning to overwhelm local circuits of 
exchange and production. At the same time, modern multilateral diplomacy 
began to replace dynastic diplomacy. In 1865, for example, the International 
Telecommunications Union became the first standing intergovernmental 
organization, symbolising the emergence of permanent institutions of global 
governance. The British Companies Act of 1862 has already been mentioned. 
During this period, Western international society began to include some non-
Western nations, such as Japan, on the basis of a liberal ‘standard of 
civilization’ (Suzuki, 2009). At the same time, stratificatory differentiation both 
within and between states gave way to functional differentiation. In short, 1860 
serves as a useful shorthand to mark the coming into being of the modern 
world of rational-bureaucratic states, industrial societies, permanent 
technological change and global markets familiar to the 20th and 21st centuries. 
 This transformation does not loom large if viewed through the Waltzian 
lenses of organizing principle and distribution of capabilities. But it is a major 
transformation point for other tools of assessment, including social organizing 
principles, interaction capacity and mode of power.  
 
1942 
 1942 represents a third primary benchmark date, symbolizing the period 
between 1929 and 1949 during which a major financial and trading crisis paved 
the way to World War Two via breakdowns in liberal economic and political 
practices, and ideational changes including the rise of fascism in three great 
powers (Germany, Italy and Japan). By 1942, all the great powers were 
engaged in a systemic war whose outcome hung in the balance. The 1929 
crash was followed by Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the 
expansionism of Nazi Germany, which were the forerunners of systemic 
conflict. During the same period, nuclear weapons changed the utility of war by 
blurring the distinction between victory and defeat, and by opening the 
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possibility of human species suicide. Clustered around this date are several 
other substantial transformations: a polarity shift from multipolar to bipolar; the 
demise of colonialism and racism as institutions of international society; and a 
major increase in the membership and scale of international society through 
extensive decolonization. The US succeeded Britain as hegemon of the liberal 
order, and helped to extend the scope of liberal international order through 
institutions such as the UN and the introduction of new financial and trade 
regimes. The 1949 revolution in China added a new revolutionary power to the 
system, with considerable long-term effects. In terms of interaction capacity, 
civil aviation took off in a big way on the back of aircraft technology developed 
during the war, quickly replacing shipping as the main form of international 
transport for human beings and light freight. 
 In the 1942 cluster, therefore, sit changes in the distribution and mode of 
power, systemic crises (both military-political and economic), shifts in both 
social organizing principles and the scale of international society, and a lesser 
change in interaction capacity. 
 
Secondary benchmark dates  
 
 Secondary benchmarks represent significant clusters but are not 
associated with deep change and do not necessarily carry global significance. 
We highlight three: 1648, 1800 and 1916.  
 
1648 
 We reluctantly stick with 1648 as a benchmark date because, whatever 
the ins and outs of the Treaties of Westphalia themselves, this date is a 
reasonable tipping point in the emergence of the absolutist sovereign state. 
This process stretched from the late 15th century (see Buzan and Little, 2000: 
401-2) through the Glorious Revolution in England in 1688, to the Treaty of 
Utrecht in 1713, which consolidated the balance of power as an institution of 
European international society. 1648 thus ticks two big Waltzian boxes: change 
in the organizing principle and change in the nature of the dominant unit. It also 
involves big changes in the social organizing principle and a major crisis (the 
30 Years War). For many in IR, this transformation marks the beginning of 
‘modernity’ in the form of the sovereign territorial state as the defining unit of 
analysis (as opposed to the conglomerate empire). And, as Clark (2005: 51-70; 
more tentatively Holsti, 1991: 39) argues, Westphalia also marked the coming 
into being of a self-conscious international society of states in Europe.  
 However, there are two major reasons why 1648 is a secondary rather 
than a primary benchmark date. The first is that it is a largely European event, 
therefore lacking the global credentials for primary benchmark status. Only 
those in thrall to the idea that European history is world history could see 1648 
as globally significant. Second, Westphalia does not mark the transition to 
modernity. It is true that Westphalia can stand for the idea of the territorial state 
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and, more arguably, the idea of sovereignty (but not sovereign equality) as a 
defining practice of international relations. What eventually spread around the 
world, however, was not the absolutist state associated with Westphalia, but 
the rational-bureaucratic state which emerged during the 19th century (for which 
1860 serves as a superior segue). 
 
1800 
1800 serves as a symbolic date for the cluster of changes stretching from 
the American revolution (1776) to the Treaty of Vienna (1815). This cluster, 
usually represented by 1815, already receives some attention in IR. Ikenberry 
(2001) sees the end of the Napoleonic Wars as an important forerunner for 
settlements that bind states together in cooperative institutional frameworks 
and lock-in stable forms of order. Much realist work uses the 1815-1848 period 
as a test case for balance of power theory (e.g. Schroeder, 1994). And both 
democratic peace theory and the Correlates of War databases tend to use 
1815-16 as the starting point for their coding. Few IR frameworks pay much 
attention to the Atlantic revolutions of France, Haiti and America. Yet these 
revolutions established the contours of debates about social organizing 
principles which were to resound loudly over the subsequent two centuries: the 
extension of market relations and the emergence of resistances to them; the 
rise of nationalism and republicanism as ideological forces; and (particularly in 
the case of Haiti) the role of racism in sustaining global hierarchies. Likewise, 
little scholarly attention is paid to the Latin American Wars of Independence 
during the early part of the 19th century. Yet these wars were important to the 
formation of modern international society in two ways: they led to an expansion 
of international society from European to Western; and, like the Atlantic 
Revolutions, they marked the rise of new ideologies such as republicanism and 
nationalism that proved disruptive to international order over the next two 
centuries.  
Yet although 1800 represents a significant cluster, it does not have the 
global consequences required to be a primary benchmark date. International 
society still remained largely defined by states within the European cultural 
tradition. There was no significant change in polarity – the US remained 
peripheral to world politics and was not a great power for some time to come. 
The Treaty of Vienna was a conservative peace which re-imposed the 
absolutist status quo ante, meaning no basic change in the dominant unit. 
Although ideologies like nationalism and republicanism were beginning to 
disrupt international order, these were not yet altering the primary institutions of 
international society. At the same time, more radical ideas, such as socialism 
and free-trade liberalism, were not yet transforming the fundamental practices 
of the international system. Similarly, there are no global changes in interaction 
capacity associated with this date and only marginal shifts in the mode of 





 1916 serves as a shorthand for a cluster of changes stretching from the 
fall of the Qing Empire in China in 1911 through to the end of the First World 
War. It embodies two major crises: World War One itself, and the Russian 
revolution. During this period, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires also 
collapsed, leading to another expansion in the membership of international 
society. World War One was important as the first systemic industrial conflict 
and as the culmination of dynamics which had festered during the latter part of 
the 19th century. The war accelerated Britain’s decline and heralded, but does 
not represent, a power shift from Europe to North America. In retrospect, the 
war made only marginal changes in the distribution of power, and almost none 
in social organizing principles. Even the League of Nations was only an 
extension, albeit an ambitious one, of developments in standing IGOs started 
several decades earlier. Although there were some changes in the mode of 
power (aircraft, submarines), these reflected earlier technological 
breakthroughs. Arguably the Russian revolution was the most important event 
in this cluster for understanding the configurational quality of macro-historical 
dynamics around this time. By embedding a new social organizing principle 
within a powerful state, it influenced the ideological make-up and conflictual 
alignment of the international system for the following seven decades.  
 
Tertiary benchmark dates  
 
 Tertiary benchmarks are mainly point-in-time events which either do not 
have a supporting cluster, or are mainly local/regional. We also propose that 
this classification be used for recent dates that appear to be significant, but for 
which there is insufficient distance by which to assess their depth and breadth. 
Some constraint is necessary to avoid premature elevations of recent events to 
benchmark date status, as is the case with 1989 and 2001. Perhaps something 
like a ‘thirty-year rule’ might be applied before moving candidates out of tertiary 
status. We highlight one older tertiary benchmark date, 1905, and several 
recent events that mostly fall within the thirty-year rule. 
 
1905  
The Japanese defeat of Tsarist Russia in 1905 meant that the country 
became recognized as the first non-white great power. This was a stirring event 
at the time, providing a challenge to Western notions of cultural and racial 
superiority. In retrospect, it stands as the first major move in what is currently 
thought of as ‘the rise of the rest’, when non-Western societies harnessed 
industrialization, modern state building and ideologies of progress in 
indigenous configurations (Zakaria, 2008). The potentially greater significance 
of 1905 is that it marks the end of a period in which the West established the 
contours of a core-periphery international order. The inter-societal formations 
which enabled the emergence and institutionalization of this system also 
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contained, paradoxically, the seeds for the rise of such non-Western powers. 
As a result, the specific rise of Japan, as captured in its defeat of Russia, 
portended the general decline of the West. Or to put this another way, the 
debate about global (as opposed to merely European/Western) power shifts 
that occupies many commentators in the contemporary world has its origins in 
late 19th century and early 20th century dynamics. 1905 represents a segue into 
this wider dynamic. 
 
1978-2008 
 1989 has already become embedded as a benchmark date for IR, 
marking a significant change in the distribution of power and a minor expansion 
of international society, as well as the end of a major ideological struggle over 
the organization of modern social orders. In terms of changing the distribution 
of power and, perhaps, serving notice of the end of this ideological 
confrontation, China’s opening-up in 1978 looks at least as significant as 1989. 
And polarity shifts are the least important form of system structure change. The 
on-going transformation of interaction capacity suggests 1991 and the release 
of the World Wide Web as a landmark perhaps comparable with the 
emergence of the telegraph. The consolidation and expansion of the European 
Union from 1993 might also be important.   
Into this period fits the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, with their major 
impact on security practices, and the 2008 economic crisis. It is too early to tell 
what the impact of the 2008 crisis is, although there is a developing sense that 
it is a major global event. As things stand, the events of 2008 and since have 
primarily impacted on Europe and the United States. However, the ripple 
effects of the crisis are potentially substantial and it may be that, over time, 
these events form part of a broader configuration in which neoliberalism 
becomes reduced from an orthodoxy into one amongst a range of capitalist 
assemblages (Sassen, 2010). At the same time, it is possible to see the 
financial crisis as, like the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, part of a broader 
range of processes that mark the relative decline of Western power. As such, 
2008 serves to make the point that benchmark dates can shift in significance 
depending both on optic (long-term vs. short-term) and context (regional vs. 
global). Finally, this period is also associated with heightened awareness of 
climate change. The rise of environmental concerns might, in a longer 
perspective, constitute a tenth major form of change in international relations. 
 
Table 2 – A Summary of Proposed IR Benchmarks 
 
Primary Benchmarks Secondary Benchmarks Tertiary Benchmarks 
 
1500   
 1648  
  
25 
1860 1800  
 1916 1905 
1942   
  1978-2008 
 
 While the process of assessing benchmark dates is always open to new 
developments and changes in historical understanding, recent events are, as 
noted above, particularly difficult to evaluate. Table 2 could, therefore, look 
quite different in a longer-term perspective. For example, a macro-historical 
perspective might entail seeing World Wars One and Two as a single event – 
the civil war of modernity – running from 1911 to 1949, with a tipping point at 
1931. That would be more in line with other three-to-four decade clusters like 
those around 1500, 1800 and 1860. Perhaps such a longer-term lens would 
also incorporate the Cold War as a second round of the civil war of modernity, 
entailing a cluster from 1911 to 1989, with a tipping point at 1940. Thinking 
along these lines suggests a different approach to ranking benchmark dates. 
Rather than assessing their relative global significance and the depth of their 
nested changes, the aim would be to place dates within a cluster that 
represents a specific macro-historical configuration, and whose significance is 




 This paper is intended to open rather than close a debate. Our suggested 
schema for benchmark dates should be seen as a provocation rather than as a 
cast-in-stone proposition. Our view is that, whatever its faults, this schema 
represents a more incisive way of opening-up international relations as a field 
of enquiry than IR’s orthodox set of benchmark dates. By bringing in criteria 
from a range of mainstream IR theories, and making them explicit, it moves the 
process of allocating benchmark dates beyond the realist criteria that dominate 
the orthodox set. It questions, but does not dismiss, the importance of major 
wars as benchmark dates, while at the same time elevating the status of other 
transformative processes, particularly those associated with the ‘long 19th 
century’. It emphasizes clusters of processes more than point-in-time events. 
And more than anything else, the paper invites IR scholars to think about, 
reflect upon and problematize the constitutive practice of conferring benchmark 
status on particular dates. The discipline does this all too easily, most recently 
in relation to 1989 (Lawson 2010).  
Our argument suggests five main conclusions: 
 
 First, benchmark dates in IR should be ranked in order of importance: 
primary benchmark dates feature a combination of deep change, extensive 
clustering and global impact; secondary dates are tipping points around 
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which a set of changes cluster, but do not necessary carry global 
importance; tertiary dates are point-in-time events which are usually 
local/regional rather than global in consequence. 
 Second, over time, benchmark dates are likely to move up and down, or in 
and out of, any given ranking. Reassessment is a necessary part of the 
process. That said, more awareness of the criteria outlined above for 
allocating such status would enable better judgments, better critiques and 
better conversations between theoretical perspectives. IR scholars and 
students will continue to debate the importance of particular benchmark 
dates. But they should be more critical about this exercise and conduct it in 
a more systematic way. 
 Third, major wars should no longer be seen as the main or automatic 
defining feature of IR benchmark dates. Some have that status; others do 
not. Economic, technological and ideational developments should be given 
more attention, even when they are not associated with major wars. 
 Fourth, IR should pay more attention to benchmark dates rooted in and 
around the 19th century ‘global transformation’, exploring the ways in which 
the configuration of industrialization, rational state-building and ideologies of 
progress transformed key processes in the international sphere. 
 Fifth, there needs to be a greater differentiation between regionally and 
globally specific benchmark dates, and within this an understanding that 
Europe is also a region. Before 1500 there is no global level to speak of, so 
pushing this kind of analysis deeper into history would require altering the 
scales of analysis. 
 
If nothing else, this exercise makes clear that IR’s orthodox set of 
benchmark dates is flawed. The orthodox set emphasizes the distribution of 
power without focusing sufficiently either on the changing mode of power or on 
the social, economic and political transformations which underpin such 
changes. And it emphasizes wars without looking closely enough at the social 
developments that give rise to them. IR’s orthodox benchmark dates narrow 
IR’s engagement with both history and the adjacent social sciences, and 
reinforce a parochial set of concerns. A rearticulation of IR around a more 
carefully considered and open set of benchmark dates would generate both a 
more acute historical antenna and a more deeply formed contemporary 
agenda. It would also put IR in a stronger position to exchange ideas with 
neighbouring disciplines in the social sciences and history. 
 
References 
Armstrong, David (1993) Revolution and World Order, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baylis, John, and Steve Smith (eds.) (2001) The Globalization of World Politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
27 
Bayly, C.A. (2004) The Birth of the Modern World 1780-1914, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Bell, Duncan (2007) The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of 
World Order 1860-1900, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Brown, Chris and Kirsten Ainley (2009) Understanding International Relations, 
4th revised ed., London: Palgrave. 
Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 
London: Macmillan. 
Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson, (eds.) (1984) The Expansion of International 
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Buzan, Barry (2004) From International to World Society? English School 
Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Buzan, Barry (2010) ‘Culture and International Society’, The Martin Wight 
Lecture for 2009, International Affairs, 86:1, 1-25. 
Buzan, Barry, Charles Jones and Richard Little (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: 
Neorealism to Structural Realism, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (1996) ‘Reconceptualizing Anarchy: Structural 
Realism Meets World History’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:4, 
403-38. 
Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) International Systems in World History: 
Remaking the Study of International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2010) ‘The Historical Expansion of 
International Society’ in Robert A. Denemark (ed.) The International Studies 
Encyclopedia, Vol. V, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 3339-56. 
Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen (2009) The Evolution of International Security 
Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, Barry and Mathias Albert (2010) ‘Differentiation: A Sociological 
Approach to International Relations Theory’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 16:3, 315-37. 
Buzan, Barry and George Lawson (2013), ‘The Global Transformation: The 19th 
Century and the Making of Modern International Relations’, International 
Studies Quarterly 47:1, in press.   
Carvalho, Benjamin de, Halvard Leira and John Hobson (2011) ‘The Big Bangs 
of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919’, 
Millennium, 39:3, 735-58. 
  
28 
Clark, Ian (2005) Legitimacy in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Clark, Ian (2007) International Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford University 
Press.  
Clark, Ian (2011) Hegemony in International Society, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Deudney, Daniel H. (2007) Bounding Power, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Doyle, Michael W. and G. John Ikenberry (eds.) (1997) New Thinking in 
International Relations Theory, Boulder CO: Westview Press. 
Gilpin, Robert (1981) War & Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gilpin, Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Grant, A.F., Arthur Greenwood, J.D.I. Hughes, P.H. Kerr, F.F. Urquhart (1916) 
An Introduction to International Relations, London: Macmillan. 
Green, William A. (1992) ‘Periodization in European and World History’ Journal 
of World History 3:1, 13-53.  
Halliday, Fred (1999) Revolution and World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Held, David et al (1999) Global Transformations, Cambridge: Polity. 
Herz, John H. (1957) ‘The Rise and Demise of the Territorial State’, World 
Politics, 9:4, 473-93. 
Hobsbawm, Eric (1962) The Age of Revolution 1789-1848, London: Abacus. 
Hobson, John (2012) The Eurocentric Origins of International Relations, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Holsti, Kalevi J. (1991) Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order, 
1648-1989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Holsti, Kalevi J. (2004) Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in 
International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hutchings, Kimberly (2008) Time and World Politics, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Ikenberry, John G. (2001) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the 
Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, Princeton N.J: Princeton University 
Press. 
Ikenberry, John G. (2009) ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the 
Dilemmas of Liberal World Order’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1, 71-86. 
  
29 
Keene, Eddie (2002) Beyond the Anarchical Society, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (2001), World Politics: Trend 
and Transformation, 8th ed. New York: St Martin’s. 
Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye (1977) Power and Interdependence, 
Boston: Little Brown. 
Knutsen, T. (1992) The History of International Relations Theory, 2nd ed. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press 
Lawson, George (2005) Negotiated Revolutions (London: Ashgate).  
Lawson, George (2010) ‘Introduction: The ‘What’, ‘When’ and ‘Where’ of the 
Global 1989’, in George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox (eds.). 
The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1-20. 
Lundestad, Geir (2005) East West North South, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
May, Ernest (1975) “Lessons” of the Past, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mayall, James (1990) Nationalism and International Society, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Morgenthau, Hans (1978) Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. revised, New York: 
Knopf. 
Nexon, Daniel (2009) The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Oatley, Thomas (2007) International Political Economy: Interests and 
Institutions in the Global Economy, London: Longman. 
Onuf, Nicholas (2002) ‘Institutions, Intentions and International Relations’, 
Review of International Studies, 28:2, 211-228. 
Osiander, Andreas (2001) ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55(20): 251-287. 
Polanyi, Karl (1957 [1944]) The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press. 
Philpott, Daniel (2001) Revolution in Sovereignty, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Reus-Smit, Christian (1999) The Moral Purpose of the State, Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Reus-Smit, Christian (2011) ‘Struggles for Individual Rights and the Expansion 
of the International System’, International Organization, 65:2, 207-42. 
Rosenberg, Justin (1994) The Empire of Civil Society, London: Verso. 
  
30 
Ruggie, John G. (1983) ‘’Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: 
Toward a Neorelaist Synthesis’, World Politics, 35:2, 261-85. 
Russett, B. & H. Starr (2004), World Politics: The Menu for Choice 7th ed. 
Belmont CA: Thomson Wadsworth. 
Sassen, Saskia (2010) ‘The Return of Primitive Accumulation’, in George 
Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox eds. The Global 1989, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 51-75. 
Schmidt, Brian (1998). The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary 
History of IR, New York: SUNY Press. 
Schroeder, Paul (1994) ‘Historical Reality versus Neorealist Theory’, 
International Security, 19:1, 108-48. 
Shilliam, Robbie (2011) ‘The Perilous but Unavoidable Terrain of the Non-
West’, in Robbie Shilliam ed., International Relations and Non-Western 
Thought, London: Routledge, 12-26.  
Suzuki, Shogo (2009) Civilization and Empire, London: Routledge. 
Teschke, Benno (2003) The Myth of Westphalia, London: Verso.  
Tickner, Arlene and David Blaney eds. (2011) Thinking International Relations 
Differently, London: Routledge.  
Vucetic, Srdjan (2011) The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity 
in International Relations, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) The Modern World System, New York: Academic 
Press. 
Walt, Stephen (1997) Revolution and War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, Reading Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1981) ‘The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More may be 
Better’, Adelphi 171, London: IISS. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1990) ‘Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory’. Journal of 
International Affairs, 44:1, 21-37. 
Watson, Adam (1992) The Evolution of International Society, London: 
Routledge. 
Wendt, Alexander (1992) ‘Anarchy is what States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46:2, 391-425. 
Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 




                                                 
1
 We would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for EJIR, and colleagues at the LSE, 
Copenhagen University and UBC for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. 
2 We do not look at subfield specific benchmark dates in this article, although this could be 
an interesting area for further exploration. 
3 Our focus is on mainstream theories because our aim is to establish the principal ways in 
which IR organizes its research and teaching, and presents itself to other disciplines. 
Because most IR scholars use these theories, such a survey also illustrates what events and 
processes are considered significant by most of the discipline. 
4 An alternative to 2008 might be 2011, when the OECD economies became less than half 
of the world total. Thanks to Yves Tiberghien for this point. 
5 Feminist work might be included here, but does not make an explicit feature of benchmark 
dates. Some feminist analysis fits within dates already in play: the gendered construction of 
the Westphalian state, and the improvements in women’s rights associated with the First 
and Second World Wars. Someone should do an article on this. 
